This is the next piece in my look at our war strategy in Iraq.
What is our objective in Iraq? It looks like we have a lot of them. The establishment of an Iraqi liberal democracy. Fighting a guerilla war. Establishing a viable Iraqi economy that is not based on oil socialism. Building/rebuilding infrastructure. Increasing Iraqi oil output. Building a strong Iraqi army. Establishing an honest police force. There are probably others I have left out. Mention them in the comments.
Since this is a discussion of politico/military strategy (all military effort is ultimately about politics since as Clauswitz points out – war is politics by other means – war is how you get a political decision when talking does not work) it is important to see the political dimension of our efforts.
The first phase of the Iraq war succeeded brilliantly. There the question of objective was clear and straight forward. End the rule of Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party. That was accomplished in three or four weeks. Brilliantly I might add. Mission accomplished.
The following phase was one where Iraq had no goverrnment and no army. Iraq was a political vacuum. Which made it an attractive target of political opportunists of all stripes. That phase ended with the votes on the Iraqi Constitution and elections for national offices.
So far so good. The question then becomes what mistake are we making now that we made in Vietnam?
The answer is pretty straight forward. We are not providing sufficient security to the Iraqi people. I think the reason is pretty fundamental. We are providing street by street security. The Iraqis are better equipped to handle that job. After all they will know better than any American the language and culture of Iraq.
This leads to look at two further problems. One is the sorry state of the Iraqi police forces. Corruption is endemic and some of the police seem much less than even handed. In some cases they are allied with the insurgents. In other cases they seem intent on settling old scores. This will have to be fixed.
The second problem is external security. The training of the Iraqi forces is coming along. However, external security is where American forces can be of the most benefit to the situation. We know that Syria is providing a rat line for entry of jihadis into Iraq. We know Iran is providing material support. This has to be choked off at the border to begin with. It also ultimately requires intense pressure military as well as financial on Iran. Senator McCain was asked about what American policy towards Iran should be. He has the right idea:
Another man — wondering if an attack on Iran is in the works — wanted to know when America is going to “send an air mail message to Tehran.”
McCain began his answer by changing the words to a popular Beach Boys song. “Bomb bomb bomb, bomb bomb Iran,” he sang to the tune of Barbara Ann. “Iran is dedicated to the destruction of Israel. That alone should concern us but now they are trying for nuclear capabilities. I totally support the President when he says we will not allow Iran to destroy Israel.”
Our number one objective then has to be to secure Iraq. Everything else that has to be done in Iraq, such as improving the infrastructure, depends on security, both internal and external.
Cross Posted at Power and Control
Comments
5 responses to “The Objective – Iraq”
The single best reason to invade Iran is it’s geostrategic location in regard to attacking the rest of the ME, particularly Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. This is especially true since it would put Iran in a vise between Iraq and Afghanistan, and Syria in a vise between Iraq and Israel.
The second reason is Iraq’s oil supply, which you touch on, but don’t go fart enough with, IMHO. Basically, the ME oil supply is divided between Iran, Saudi, Iraq, and the Gulf States. The Saudi supply, President Bush could figure might be secure because of his family’s relationships. The Gulf States don’t seem to have lunatics in charge and are more interested in the money. Iran would like to cause trouble that way, but needs the money for its’ own purposes. The plan would be to punch out Iraq, secure its’ oil (for the world economy, not just ours), then Iran, then, if needed, Saudi, unless we could persuade them to assume a more “Gulf State” posture. Syria could fit in the gaps between the others.
Unfortunately, that would have required the Reagan era military (thanks, BJ), and a country which wasn’t dealing with a large fifth column including in the CIA and State Department.
The one thing that no one, and I do mean *no one* had planned for in post-war Iraq is the utter vaporization of the entire regime from very top to street cleaner. The evaporation of the military forces was captured by UAV and guncams of men running *from* tanks and vehicles shedding their clothing as they went. No one remained at their offices in the government for a very good reason: they were hated and feared being killed if they stayed. As no battle plan survives contact with the enemy (‘That is why they are called The Enemy’) so no post-war plan survives when the foundations of expactations are fully withdrawn from it. The power vacuum in southern Iraq was complete and utter. The Coalition spent a month trying to *find* the government, police and anyone to offer surrender from the Armed Forces. Note the lack of anyone cited as sticking to their job or entire Army divisions standing down and awaiting orderly demobilization.
The Coalition got stuck with the entire kit ‘n kaboodle.
The necessities at that point were to establish some peace *anywhere* and the best place to start were those places mostly untouched by the conflict. Once stabilization had begun then a process could be put down to slowly start figuring out the political and military aspects of things. Of false starts there were many. No one in their right mind had *ever* planned on this… not the DoD, State, CIA… no one. So the most reliable people to handle such problems are the actual ‘boots on the ground’.
The nature of Iraq, being highly tribal as its most reliable, operating basis is *still*, to this day, not understood by the average American. And that basis was being heavily eroded by Saddam and the Ba’athists for decades, until even the tribe was failing in some areas and the *family* became the reliable basis for government.
Iraq is a criss-cross of sociological, demographic and religious faultlines that criss-cross the Middle East in such ways that there is no real clear dividing lines beyond Ethnic and Tribal. Saddam attacked *both* of those to try and make a Stateless and anomic population that was *only* attached to the hand-outs of the regime.
The area of the Middle East bears a hard and striking resemblance to *another* area of this fine world where the West has failed miserably in post-war understanding of highly factionalized society. Luckily that area does not have large geographic extent nor does it have high amounts of cash flowing through it, so it has been ignored, less than safely, for decades. And it is that corollary that is deeply, and highly disturbing, as the West has been unable in modern times to deal with such things in a straightforward fashion and work out something that would work in this other place. The lessons learned there are of the sort: ‘what not to do’.
The Balkans.
I shudder to think of what it would have been like in the 1920’s if Serbs, Croats, Bosniacs, Albanians and other ethnic groups had *lots* of money flowing through their hands. And they are in *Europe* where the West has failed, both in liberal democracy and communist totalitarianism.
Getting Iraq ‘stable’ requires a re-ordering of affairs in the Middle East after the truly atrocious post-WWI Treaties which were, in turn, not adhered to. In 1917 that was the very first region that the US put forth that *trade* was more important than fighting an *enemy*, and that we hoped for good things to come from continued trade… with the Ottoman Empire.
Worked out so well, didn’t it?
This putting money before fighting to establish freedom concept. And the idea that Transnational Institutions will *govern* over Nations. Before these two things split apart to become mantras for doing *nothing* by the Right and the Left they were with one man – Pres. Woodrow Wilson. In *not fighting* the US was seen as *not participating* and was left out of the peace talks as a major power. And the absolute instability in the region is due precisely to not fighting in 1917-18, and that probably would have gone on for a bit longer, too.
Pres. Wilson decided not to pay the piper then, for grand ideas of how to make a stable Middle East.
And now we pay.
Getting Iraq internally in a dynamically stable situation, with competing interests all cross-checking each other to form a basis for government is a start. But that dynamic tension is at high risk from all the overlaps and crossing faults from *all* of its neighbors. And somehow these huge ‘Peace Conferences’ haven ‘t gotten us any peace in that region for long decades. Some stability during the stasis of the Cold War, yes… but that is not the same as peace.
I think some of hte Balkan comparisons are very apt; and no one who is calling for withdrawal has really considered the bloodshed for the Iraqis alone that will follow. It is so diappointing how many of our elected officials and pundits have no grasp of history, and less foresight.
You really can’t split Iraq’s security problems along internal and external, they are intertwined to a tremendous extent. You are correct in stating that security is the most important, but securtiy is much more than killing off the terrorist in the midst of the innocent.
Not only do American Soldiers need to have presence alongside Iraqi Soldiers on every street to establish security, but our elected officials need to be state that the US government will keep Americans alongside Iraqis until security is established. Why should an Iraqi Soldier risk his life and his family’s life for little or no pay if he believes he’ll be standing alone guarding our withdrawal in a few month’s time?
Another frustrating thing is seeing hard working Iraqi Soldiers and police being hamstrung because certain Iraqi governemnt officials may be withholding their pay and budget for beter equipment do to corruption or sectarianism.
The “if it bleeds it leads” coverage doesn’t help much either; the terrorists run rings around us in the information and media exploitation game.
Another thing that anyone genuinely interested in IRaq needs to understand is that the problems facing stabilisation efforts vary almost literally from town to town, one town has nationalist forces fighting Al Qaeda, another has Sunni vs. Shia, some are even beset by simplw Mafia -style power plays; there is no one solution for Iraq.
I have served tow tours in Iraq, and I do believe that peace and progress can be achieved, but it will take a dedication I fear far too many in Congress lack.
SFC SKI,
Thanks so much for the comment!!
You say:
You really can’t split Iraq’s security problems along internal and external, they are intertwined to a tremendous extent.
Agreed. However, what I was thinking of was more about a division of labor. Americans do primarily border security. Iraqis do mainly internal security.
With the whole job ultimately being handed over to the Iraqis – when they are ready.
As to the spineless in Congress. I think they are one termers. Think of the ’72 elections when we elected Nixon (a truly vile man) over his anti-war Democrat rival.
The most important thing to be done in winning this war is that more soldiers like you speak out. You don’t even have to blog. Comments on blogs are equally helpful.
May I add that if doing a longer post interests you contact me at:
Power and Control
My address is on the sidebar.
BTW I’m sure it is too far above your pay grade, but our war leaders are really letting us down by not getting more news and views of the troops out.
War is 3/4s morale. The DOD and the President are letting the home front down.
The message is simple: There is a democratically elected government in Iraq under attack by the disgruntled, by former Nazi emulating Baathists, and by external forces. This Iraqi government may fall at the next election. We will not let it fall to violence.
Sometimes the best way to save the dog is by corralling the cat. Think about it.