Financing our enemies

I am a regular reader of Michael Yon’s excellent reports on the war in Afghanistan, two of which were linked today by Glenn Reynolds.

One of the things I find tiresome about the ongoing war against the Taliban is not simply that it drags on, but the way it is being funded.

There doesn’t seem to be much debate over the fact that the Taliban gets the bulk of its funding from opium.

Taliban soldiers captured in battle say poppy proceeds pay the bulk of their operational funding—including salaries for fighters and money tobuy fuel, food, weapons, and explosives.

Across the political spectrum, there have been passionate calls like this for eradicating the opium crop.

Afghanistan is not just a bloody death trap; it is also a breeding ground for narcoterrorist activities. Narcoterrorism, the act of supporting terrorist activities by drug trafficking, and vice versa, provides hundreds of millions of dollars worth of support for violent insurgencies. To prevent the spread of both terrorism and illegal drug trafficking, the United States and its coalition partners must eradicate opium production in Afghanistan.

Given that Afghanistan ranks an abysmal 155 out of 169 in the United Nations Human Development Index (a ranking only slightly above hellholes such as Niger and Zimbabwe), it should not be surprising to find that the country is rife with illegal drug trade and violence. Much of the opium produced in Afghanistan eventually finds its way to the United States, often in the processed form of heroin. U.S. government figures demonstrate that a majority of the world’s heroin originates from the region.

What isn’t mentioned is that efforts at “eradication” do not eradicate; they only drive up profits. Even the Taliban’s ban on poppy growing  provides an intriguing example of how suppliers of illegal drugs (who are not stupid) can reap huge profits from crackdowns. And when the suppliers run the government, the result is insider trading:

It was the largest cutback in illicit drug production in Afganistan or any other nation in a singleyear. Frahi, who brokered the deal for the UNODC, called it “one of the most remarkable successes ever” in the fight against narcotics.62 In fact, the very opposite was true. The ban created a humanitarian crisis by leaving thousands of small farmers and share croppers without income, and almost overnight, the price of opium at Afghanistan’s border shot up from an all-time low of about $28 per kilo to between $350 and $400, according to UNODC and DEA accounts, leaving farmers heavily indebted for their farm loans. And despite the ban on growing poppy,Western authorities began to notice the Taliban made no effort to seize drug stocks or arrest traffickers. One Western mission to determine the scale of drug stockpiles being held reported that opium markets in Sangin, Ghani Khel, Musa Qala, Kajaki, and Achin appeared to have greatly reduced their levels of business, but the mission was never able to determine where, if any, stockpiles were being held.63 Meanwhile, U.S. officials reported that the Taliban still collected tax at refineries—now earning much higher revenue off a product that had increased tenfold in value.64 Levels of heroin purity declined somewhat in Western markets the following year, but the street price of heroin remained stable, indicating there was no supply shortage.65

Some Western and Afghan officials have concluded that the poppy ban was the ultimate insider trading act. According to this theory, the Taliban believed they stood to gain millions of dollars in international aid and perhaps even recognition of their government (neither of which theyreceived in the end, however). The UN-affiliated Narcotics Control Board concluded that afterfour years of bumper crops, stocks of Afghan heroin were big enough to supply the European market for four more years.66 More than a half-dozen well-placed tribal sources and Afghan officials interviewed for this project said senior Taliban leaders and Haji Bashar Noorzai purchased massive amounts of opium just before the ban. “It wasn’t religion,” said a Quettabasedsmuggler. “It was good business. They bought low, they sold high.”67

On September 11, 2001, the regional price of a kilo of opium had reached an all-time high of $746. Within weeks of the attacks on New York and Washington, it had dropped to $95 akilo, according to DEA records, possibly indicating that owners were dumping stockpiles in anticipation of the U.S.-led invasion.

The above analysis also concludes with another call for getting tougher on Afghan opium.

I think it is obvious that if the Taliban has been smart enough historically to stockpile opium (which can be stored indefinitely)  in anticipation of problems, it has to be assumed that they are continuing to do so. Much of the opium is stored in Pakistan, which makes it even tougher to reach. So, any crackdown, whether by crop eradication or tough penalties being meted out to growers, will (assuming prices go up) benefit primarily the Taliban. Moreover, if farmers’ fields are targeted in a slash and burn campaign, the Taliban will derive additional benefits  of having a propaganda opportunity.

Why are we helping our enemies in real wars by means of the phony and unwinnable drug war? I’m really surprised — “astonished” is a better word — that none of these analysts have considered another, more logical approach.

The Taliban’s opium profits are wholly artificial in that they are not based on the actual value of opium, but on its artificial value. If opium were legal, it would simply be another low-value cash crop. Like coffee or olive oil. It would not generate billions of dollars for the Taliban. They would be essentially cut off from what is clearly their chief source of funding, and unless they found something else fast (unlikely in an impoverished country like Afghanistan), they would be unable to fund their fighters.

Which means they would lose.

It makes me mad to consider that we are fighting an enemy funded principally by our stupid drug laws. It’s not just Mexicans who are dying because of America’s failed war on drugs policies.

So are American soldiers.