I’d use a different word for the title but this is a semi-reputable blog. But the word I used is pertinent. A guy has a theory. The theory is that falling cocaine prices led to a drop in the murder rate.
But despite drug busts and stricter regulations, cocaine prices kept declining. In fact, prices have been declining since before the War on Drugs even began. An Atlantic story from 2007 noted that the price per gram for cocaine had gone from an average of around $600 in the early 1980s to less than $200 in the mid 1990s, and was down to as little as $20 per gram with ever-increasing purity. In some instances, illegal drug prices spiked in the wake of a large drug bust or the dismantling of a cartel, but the larger trend has been markedly downward. That’s due in large part to the ingenuity of drug importers, who only got more sophisticated in their ability to bypass border security and avoid arrest following a significant bust, ultimately bringing in more product with time. That growing supply resulted in more competition between dealers who started supplying a higher purity product, at a lower cost, to win over consumers.
The author blathers on for a few more paragraphs and then delivers the money shot:
…there’s the missing piece in the DEA’s theory. Once the margin of profit for dealing small amounts of crack cocaine disappeared, being part of the drug trade was no longer worth the persistent threat of violence or the stiff criminal penalties. A 70 percent drop in cocaine prices like the one that occurred in the mid 1990s combined with competition from decentralized sources for methamphetamines and prescription narcotics would completely eliminate the minimum wage drug dealer as a viable profession.
The same goes for turf wars, which Venkatesh saw as the source of the majority of inner-city violence. He saw the life of a drug dealer as relatively violence-free up until territory conflicts with other gangs ensued. Without the high value of cocaine as a commodity, the incentive for protracted gang wars would dwindle as well as eliminate the economy for the illegal weapons, drive-by shootings, and mercenary “warriors” needed to help defend prime dealing locations. Without profit to fight over, Vankatesh thought that “gang violence would likely return to pre-crack levels.”
This also explains why there’s never been a large upswing in crime related to methamphetamine use. As long as production costs stay below that of cocaine’s already cut-rate asking price, the demand to be on the business end is low. If the financial incentive is low, the trade-off for entering a life of crime is low. At a certain point the decision matrix for entering a life of drug-related crime collapses for all but those with no other alternate financial sources or for those with a personal interest in the craft.
I think differently.
I have a different theory. Policing changed. Instead of going after whole gangs which incited violent turf wars (we had one in my city of 150,000 after a gang take down) the police started going after only the worst apples. Getting the violent guys off the street and more or less letting the rest ply their trade. The FBI knew about the gang wars initiated by a gang take down in 1986 when they actually announced it in our local paper after a spike in murder rates following the gang take down.
Of course there is a possibility that it was all the above plus a few more unmentioned or as yet unthought of.